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BRINGING MORE FINALITY TO FINALITY: 
CONDITIONAL CONSENT JUDGMENTS AND 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
THOMAS A. ENGELHARDT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, the Supreme Court of the United States typically 
denies certiorari in over 9,000 cases.1  Denying nearly  
ninety-nine percent of certiorari petitions is essential to the 
Court’s sustainability, considering its extremely limited 
resources.2  Despite the necessity of denying certiorari in an 
overwhelming majority of cases, a particular denial in 1980 
frustrated Justice Harry Blackmun.  The case was Amstar Corp. 
v. Southern Pacific Transport Co. of Texas & Louisiana.3 
The petitioner in Amstar was a sugar refiner.4  After its 
sugar was damaged during delivery, Amstar sued Southern 
Pacific Transport (“Southern Pacific”), a common carrier.5  
Although Southern Pacific initially denied liability, the real issue 
was the correct measure of damages.6  Amstar sought damages 
more than fifteen times higher than what Southern Pacific 
believed it might be liable for.7 
After Southern Pacific moved for partial summary judgment 
solely on the issue of damages, the district court granted the 
motion in Southern Pacific’s favor.8  With the quantum of 
damages determined to be the much lower of the disputed 
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., valedictorian, 2015, 
St. John’s University School of Law; B.S., summa cum laude, 2012, Marist College. 
Thank you to Professor John Hennigan for his invaluable guidance and to my 
parents for their enduring love and support. 
1 Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supreme 
court.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
2 Id. 
3 449 U.S. 924 (1980). 
4 Id. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 924–25. 
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amounts, only the issue of liability remained in the case.9  The 
partial summary judgment was, of course, interlocutory and not 
yet appealable.10 
During a pretrial conference, the parties agreed to a 
stipulation of facts and submitted a request to the court to enter 
a “consent judgment”11 on the parties’ terms.12  The parties 
stipulated that Southern Pacific was liable and that it would pay 
the damages determined by the court’s partial summary 
judgment ruling.13  The parties agreed, however, that Amstar 
could appeal the determination of damages.14  The court entered 
a consent judgment on the parties’ stipulation and included the 
following language:  “This judgment is rendered in recognition of 
the reservation by the plaintiff of its right to prosecute an 
appeal . . . in connection with this judgment and in connection 
with the partial summary judgment rendered on March 14, 
1979.”15 
Amstar made a timely appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.16  After both sides devoted their 
briefs solely to the issue of damages, the court determined that 
“the fact that both parties freely consented to the entry of a final 
judgment precludes an appeal from it.”17  The Supreme Court 
subsequently denied Amstar’s petition for certiorari.18 
In his dissent to the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice 
Blackmun noted that there was a clear dispute as to the measure 
of damages, and that appeal was not precluded by the parties’ 
stipulation to a consent judgment.19  He argued that a review of 
 
9 Id. at 925. 
10 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–92 (2012). 
11 As discussed later, a consent judgment is a judgment entered by a court based 
upon settlement terms negotiated and agreed to by the parties. E. H. Schopler, 
Annotation, Right to Appellate Review of Consent Judgment, 69 A.L.R.2d 755, § 2 
(1960). 
12 Amstar, 449 U.S. at 925 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 925–26 (quoting Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 607 
F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). 
18 Id. at 924. 
19 Id. at 926. Justice Blackmun quoted a 1928 Supreme Court decision to 
support the notion that appeal is not precluded by the parties entering into a 
consent judgment: 
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the merits of the partial summary judgment should not be 
foreclosed by an unnecessarily “strict concept of consent and 
acceptance in the face of facts that the asserted consent was 
specifically limited and that petitioner consistently and 
persistently disclaimed full settlement of the lawsuit.”20  Justice 
Blackmun concluded his dissent by stating that although the 
amount of damages at issue may not have been exceptionally 
large, the Court was mistaken in denying review “in a case where 
the principle is important.”21 
The test of time has validated Justice Blackmun’s foresight.  
Over thirty years after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Amstar, a live controversy remains with respect to the 
appealability of consent judgments.  The persistent issue is 
whether a party forfeits the right to appeal by stipulating to 
terms and entry of judgment on those terms, while reserving the 
right to appeal certain matters in the case.  Further, the 
controversy has expanded to involve not only whether certain 
rulings in a case may be appealed from a consent judgment, but 
also whether certain voluntarily dismissed claims may “spring 
back to life” upon reversal of an adverse ruling.22 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided over 
the appealability of conditional consent judgments in which 
judgments entered with the parties’ consent are conditioned on 
affirmance of an issue on appeal.23  Uniform precedent would 
benefit parties when negotiating stipulations at the trial level.  
Instances, such as in Amstar—where the parties stipulated to a 
 
The decree sought to be vacated was entered with the defendants' consent. 
Under the English practice a consent decree could not be set aside by 
appeal or bill of review, except in case of clerical error . . . . In this Court a 
somewhat more liberal rule has prevailed. Decrees entered by consent have 
been reviewed upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim of lack 
of actual consent to the decree as entered . . . . 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311,  
323–24 (1928)). 
20 Id. at 927. 
21 Id. 
22 Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting 
that upon reversal and remand, petitioner could have sought further recovery as 
part of a class). 
23 Compare LaForest v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 569 F.3d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(stating that a party to a consent judgment may reserve a right to appeal as long as 
it does so unequivocally), with Jones v. Merck & Co. (In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.), 
422 F. App’x. 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (stating that a party that 
consents to the entry of a final judgment is precluded from bringing an appeal). 
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consent judgment and prepared for appeal by solely briefing the 
issue of damages, just to have the court deny the appeal—are a 
waste of time and resources for litigants.  Looking at past and 
present case law, as well as policy factors, this Note argues 
generally for a standard that allows a party to secure appeal of 
adverse prior rulings by stipulating to a consent judgment that 
explicitly reserves a right to appeal.  More specifically, this Note 
argues that, in stipulating to a consent judgment that reserves a 
right to appeal, a party may dismiss a claim without prejudice on 
condition that the claim may be reasserted only if an adverse 
ruling is reversed on appeal.  If the challenged district court 
ruling is affirmed on appeal, the dismissal becomes binding and 
the claim may not be reasserted. 
Part I provides background on finality, including an 
overview of the final judgment rule and other statutory grants of 
appellate jurisdiction.  Part I then discusses consent judgments, 
including conditional consent judgments.  Part II examines the 
circuit splits with respect to issues of finality and the 
appealability of consent judgments that reserve a right to appeal.  
Part III presents arguments for and against strict interpretation 
and application of the finality requirement regarding consent 
judgments.  Part IV argues for resolving the controversy by 
adopting a standard by which appellate courts uniformly 
recognize a consent judgment’s reservation of a right to appeal 
certain adverse rulings.  This Note concludes by explaining how 
this standard achieves the goals of the federal judicial system, 
such as judicial economy and fairness to parties. 
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I. OVERVIEW: FINALITY; CONSENT JUDGMENTS 
A. Background on Finality 
1. Overview of Appellate Jurisdiction 
As inferior courts created by Congress, the circuit courts 
possess only such jurisdiction as Congress confers by statute.24  
28 U.S.C. § 1291 is the circuit courts’ primary basis for 
jurisdiction, conferring “jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States.”25  The 
requirement of a final judgment is called the “final-judgment 
rule.”26  A final judgment “ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”27  To 
secure appellate jurisdiction, the decision subject to appeal must 
be characterized as “final,” unless one of the narrow alternative 
statutory bases applies.28 
The primary justification for such a narrow scope of 
appellate jurisdiction is to protect the relationship between trial 
and appellate courts—a relationship that is fundamental to our 
legal system.29  The timing for bringing appeals is affected by two 
important aspects of the relationship between the trial and 
appellate courts.  The first is the trial court’s obligation of fact 
 
24 See 2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 3:123 (2015). Chief Justice 
Warren summarized the courts of appeals’ jurisdictional nature in the following way: 
It is axiomatic, as a matter of history as well as doctrine, that the existence 
of appellate jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a given type of case 
is dependent upon authority expressly conferred by statute. And since the 
jurisdictional statutes prevailing at any given time are so much a product 
of the whole history of both growth and limitation of federal-court 
jurisdiction since the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, they have always been 
interpreted in the light of that history and of the axiom that clear statutory 
mandate must exist to found jurisdiction. 
Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957). A court shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over non-final decisions and is also obliged to raise the question of 
jurisdiction sua sponte. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (“Subject-matter 
jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in 
doubt.”). 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). This provision provides an exception for when direct 
review may be granted by the Supreme Court. Id. 
26 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (10th ed. 2014). 
27 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
28 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3905 (2d ed. 2015). 
29 Id. § 3907 (noting the final judgment rule seeks to maintain “the capacities 
and performance of trial courts”). 
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finding and applying legal standards to those facts.30  The next is 
the wide discretion granted to a trial court in carrying out and 
governing procedural matters, which appellate courts normally 
defer to the trial court judge.31 These preliminary 
responsibilities—fact finding, applying legal standards, and 
ruling on procedural matters—play a vital role in an appellate 
court’s ability to accurately identify controlling legal questions.32 
Aside from the final judgment provision of § 1291, 
jurisdiction is primarily conferred on the circuit courts by the 
interlocutory appeal provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1292,33 and 
extraordinary writs authorized by the All Writs Act.34  With 
respect to § 1292, the Supreme Court delineated a test for when 
interlocutory appeal is appropriate in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp.35  This test is known as the “collateral 
order doctrine.”36  The requirements for securing “collateral order 
appeal” typically include: (1) the disputed question be 
conclusively determined by an order; (2) the appealed matter be 
separate from—and collateral to—the merits; and (3) the matter 
would effectively be unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.37 
The collateral order doctrine is based on an expansion of 
finality under § 1291; however, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that in applying the collateral order doctrine, a court shall 
“never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is 
entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012) (concerning interlocutory decisions and permitting 
review of certain interlocutory orders—most notably those involving preliminary 
injunctive relief and questions certified by the district court and accepted by the 
court of appeals). 
34 Id. § 1651. This provision enables the circuit courts and other courts to “issue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id. § 1651(a). 
35 337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949). 
36 Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989). 
37 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 105 (2015); see also Henry v. Lake Charles 
Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the three 
common requirements—that an order be conclusive, separate, and  
unreviewable—are not so much “strict preconditions” but “guidelines in making the 
pragmatic determination of whether to allow an order to be immediately appealed”). 
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has been entered.”38  Despite the narrow scope of the collateral 
order doctrine, its expansiveness provides precedent for further 
flexibility with respect to the finality requirement. 
In rarer cases, other statutes provide grounds for appellate 
review,39 and on occasion, statutes provide for the certifying of a 
question to a circuit court if the question fits a narrow category.40  
Further, statutes provide for review of acts by independent 
administrative officials or agencies within the executive branch.41  
Finally, the circuit courts are granted jurisdiction by a rather 
unusual statute in certain extremely rare cases that would 
otherwise be brought before the Supreme Court.42 
An important justification for limiting appeals to final 
judgments, collateral orders, and narrow statutory categories is 
that Congress—by providing for appeals in certain circumstances 
and not in others—has made its intent to limit appellate 
jurisdiction clear.43  Congress has made this intent clear as far 
back as the Judiciary Act of 1789 when Congress specifically  
 
 
 
 
 
38 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (governing bankruptcy appeals to the 
circuit courts). 
40  See, e.g., 52 U.S.C.A. § 30110 (West 2014) (originally enacted as Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), § 310) (providing that in a voter action 
brought to determine the constitutionality of a provision of the act, or of a certain 
section of Title 18, “The district court immediately shall certify all questions of 
constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit 
involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.”). 
41 See Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 614 F.2d 1121, 
1125 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review orders 
rendered by administrative agencies is wholly dependent upon statute.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Noland v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 544 F.2d 333, 
334 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2012). The statute covers cases that are on direct appeal 
to the Supreme Court from a district court where a quorum of qualified justices 
cannot be assembled. As a result, appeal is heard in the circuit court for the district 
in which the case was initiated, and that circuit court may make a final decision. 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3901. 
43 The collateral order doctrine involves the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
§ 1292. 
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rejected piecemeal appellate practice.44  Consequently, some 
courts feel that appeals heard in other circumstances constitute a 
run around congressional intent.45 
2. Orders Prior to Trial—Voluntary and Involuntary Dismissal 
With some background on finality, it is appropriate to 
analyze how finality is affected by pretrial orders.  The 
involuntary dismissal of a claim or the granting of summary 
judgment on an important issue may represent a loss of a vital 
part of the case.46  Under those circumstances, the adversely 
affected party may decide that it is not worth settling or pursuing 
certain remaining claims to final judgment.  In such a situation, 
a means of achieving final disposition is through voluntary 
dismissal of the remaining claims.47 
In this scenario, finality has been recognized following 
voluntary dismissals both with and without prejudice—although 
a dismissal with prejudice is a surer route to a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal.48  A final judgment—as mentioned  
above—“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for 
the court to do but execute the judgment.”49  Under these 
circumstances, it is critical to preserve the right to appeal prior 
involuntary dismissals or adverse rulings.50  Preserving the right 
to appeal is important because those prior rulings created the 
circumstances that prompted voluntary dismissal due to 
futility.51 
A safer tactic to preserve a right to appeal seems to be 
inviting dismissal without prejudice in conjunction with a 
conditional consent judgment.52  The stipulation upon which the 
court enters the judgment should expressly reserve a right to 
 
44 See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945). 
45 See Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178–79 (1955) (“Section 
22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . provided that appeals in civil actions could be 
taken to the circuit courts only from final decrees and judgments.”). 
46 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8. 
47 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41. 
48 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8; see also Division 241 Amalgamated 
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1976) (securing review 
of a dismissed count by obtaining dismissal of the remaining three counts of a four-
count complaint without prejudice). 
49 Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233. 
50 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
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appeal any adverse rulings and reinstate the dismissed claim on 
condition that those adverse rulings are reversed.53  A number of 
courts, however, have refused to exercise appellate jurisdiction 
following these stipulations fearing they “permit finality to be 
manufactured too easily.”54 
B. Background on Consent Judgments 
A consent judgment is a judgment entered by a court based 
upon settlement terms negotiated and agreed to by the parties.55  
This type of judgment is aimed at ending the litigation while 
securing an enforceable judgment.56  The parties’ mutual 
understanding and agreement with respect to the terms, 
conditions, and amounts is required before the court will enter 
judgment.57  Judges, of course, have discretion regarding whether 
to enter judgment on the parties’ terms.58 
 
 
 
53 Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 976–77 (9th Cir. 
2008). A party may still face difficulty in an appellate court that strictly adheres to 
finality. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 607 F.2d 1100, 
1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (“Although the consent judgment contained a 
recognition that the plaintiff wished to appeal the issue of the limitation of damages, 
the fact that both parties freely consented to the entry of a final judgment precludes 
an appeal from it.”). 
54 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3914.8. An important aspect of voluntarily 
invited dismissal is whether a plaintiff is permitted to reassert the relinquished 
claim. See id. 
55 Schopler, supra note 11. “A consent judgment results from mutual 
understanding and concerted action by the parties, as documented in a settlement 
agreement or stipulation which is consented to and sanctioned by the court.” Robert 
R. Zitko, The Appealability of Conditional Consent Judgments, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
241, 242 (1994) (footnotes omitted). 
56 See Schopler, supra note 11. 
57 Id. Consent judgments differ from judgments by default, judgments by 
confession, and judgments upon an agreed statement of fact. Id. Judgments by 
default differ in that they result from defendants either not having a defense or not 
offering one. Id. Judgments by confession differ in that they are based upon acts by 
defendants in which they acknowledge and admit that the plaintiff has a just and 
rightful cause of action. Id. Judgments upon an agreed statement of facts differ in 
that it is the court, rather than the parties, that makes the final determination with 
respect to matters of fact. Id. 
58 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). An important factor considered by a court is whether 
“the entry of such judgment is in the public interest.” Id. § 16(e)(1). 
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Upon entering a consent judgment, a court retains subject 
matter jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.59  In fact, a court 
may enforce a consent judgment by all means—legal and 
equitable—available to it.60  Consequently, unlike with a private 
settlement, parties do not have to file separate lawsuits each 
time the agreement is violated.61 
While a private settlement agreement may be relatively easy 
to modify, courts usually do not modify consent judgments after 
they are entered.62  Modification of the judgment will only be 
granted when compliance with the judgment is made 
substantially more onerous or illegal by changed factual or legal 
conditions.63 
Ordinarily, a consent judgment is not appealable on the 
merits.64  While consent judgments may help resolve cases more 
promptly and efficiently, some appellate courts are wary of 
considering them final since they are entered with the consent of 
both parties rather than after fully litigating all matters.65  Many 
other courts will, however, permit appeal from a consent 
judgment,66 which makes sense considering that a consent 
judgment fits quite squarely into the category of final judgments.  
Like a final judgment, a consent judgment “ends the litigation on 
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment”67 rather than non-final or interlocutory orders which 
require further steps at the trial level to decide the case on the 
merits.68 
 
59 Frederic C. Tausend & David H. Binney, Consent Judgments, in 5 BUSINESS 
AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 50:20 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d 
ed. 2013). Further, disputes are heard by a judge who is familiar, or at least should 
be, with the case. In this respect, “consent judgments ensure compliance more 
effectively than private settlements.” Id. 
60 See Cook v. City of Chi., 192 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1999). These means 
include sanctions for contempt. See Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 291 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
61 Tausend & Binney, supra note 59. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Schopler, supra note 11, § 3. 
65 Zitko, supra note 55, at 244–45. 
66 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S 311, 324 (“Decrees entered by consent 
have been reviewed upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim of lack of 
actual consent to the decree as entered . . . .”); see also Thompson v. Maxwell  
Land-Grant & Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 451, 462 (1897) (noting that review has also been 
granted based on a claim of fraud in the procurement of one party’s consent). 
67 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
68 Zitko, supra note 55, at 247. 
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However, even when hearing an appeal from a consent 
judgment, courts apply a “waiver of error” standard—a severely 
restricted scope of appellate review.69  The rationale for such a 
limited scope of review is that consent judgments are entered 
with the consent of both parties and thus do not deserve the 
same attention of valuable appellate resources as judgments that 
are favorable to one party’s wishes and unfavorable to the 
other’s.70  Generally, when applying a waiver of error standard,71 
the court determines whether a purported error falls within the 
waiver.72  With respect to a consent judgment, the court’s job is 
made relatively easy since consent judgments by their nature 
involve the parties’ consent to entry of final judgment.73  Thus, 
most courts simply affirm consent judgments without 
consideration of the merits, holding that a party waives a claim 
of error by consenting to the entry of judgment.74  As a result, 
consent judgments are subjected to a de facto rule of  
non-appealability.75 
Though there are exceptions to this general rule, the impact 
of these exceptions is limited because they involve issues that are 
separate from the substance of the trial court’s ruling.76  These  
 
 
 
69 Id. at 247–48, 250. 
70 See id. at 247. Part of the issue with this line of reasoning is that consent 
judgments are often stipulated to because of circumstances presented following an 
adverse pretrial ruling, such as a partial summary judgment. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. 
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 449 U.S. 924, 925 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (entering a consent judgment following partial summary judgment in the 
plaintiff’s favor on the issue of the appropriate measure of damages). 
71 See Zitko, supra note 55, at 250. The seminal case regarding the waiver of 
error standard of review for consent judgments is Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 311 (1928). In Swift, the Court set out waiver of error as the standard of review 
by citing the Supreme Court case United States v. Babbitt, 104 U.S. 767 (1881), 
which used waiver of error as the scope of review of a consent judgment. See Swift, 
276 U.S. at 327; Babbitt, 104 U.S. at 768. Despite never providing a clear rationale 
for the standard, the Court did allude to the fact that under English practice, 
consent judgments could only be overturned based on the finding of clerical error. 
See Swift, 276 U.S. at 323–24. 
72 Zitko, supra note 55, at 247. 
73 See supra Part I.B (“The parties’ mutual understanding and agreement with 
respect to the terms, conditions, and amounts is required before the court will enter 
[a consent] judgment.”). 
74 Zitko, supra note 55, at 247–48. 
75 Id. at 248. 
76 Schopler, supra note 11, § 3. 
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established exceptions include claims of (a) lack of actual 
consent,77 (b) fraud in the procurement of consent,78 (c) mistake,79 
and (d) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.80 
Despite the exceptions to the de facto rule of  
non-appealability, an unconditional consent judgment presents 
barriers to some litigants’ ultimate goals.81  Consequently, 
litigants have sought to use an alternative procedural tactic in 
which similar objectives are achieved yet a right to appeal is 
preserved.82  Conditional consent judgments—which make 
settlement terms conditional on affirmance of adverse  
rulings—have emerged as a means of ending litigation while 
reserving a right to appeal.83  Courts are divided over whether 
appellate review is appropriate with respect to conditional 
consent judgments.84  Issues of finality are the main reasons for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928). An attorney’s failure 
to inform the client as to the clients’ personal liability under the consent judgment 
represents sufficient lack of authority to vacate the consent judgment. Zitko, supra 
note 55, at 248. 
78 Swift, 276 U.S. at 324. 
79 Id. at 323–24. 
80 Id. at 324. A party may, of course, challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any 
point during the case and a court may raise the issue sua sponte. See Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). Parties may not create 
subject matter jurisdiction through stipulation or waiver. A court must—in addition 
to jurisdiction over the subject matter—have jurisdiction over each party to the 
consent judgment before it can issue such a judgment. Zitko, supra note 55, at 250. 
81 For example, the waiver of error standard of appeal is not helpful to an 
individual who wishes to settle after receiving an adverse pretrial ruling, but 
believes she has a strong case on appeal to have the prior ruling reversed. See id. at 
251–52. For this individual, the best situation would be settlement on condition that 
the adverse judgment is reviewed on the merits and affirmed on appeal. 
82 See, e.g., INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 
1993) (entering of judgment by the court with the consent of both parties and 
“without waiving the right of the defendant to appeal” a pretrial evidentiary ruling). 
83 See Zitko, supra note 55, at 251–52. This includes conditional settlement of 
damages based on the circumstances as they present themselves following adverse 
pretrial rulings as well as conditional dismissal of certain claims that are futile 
based on such adverse rulings. 
84 Schopler, supra note 11, § 3. 
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the split among authorities,85 as some view conditional 
judgments as non-final because they are entered “for the express 
purpose of facilitating an appeal.”86 
II. NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY—CIRCUIT SPLITS 
The appealability of consent judgments presents 
longstanding and recurring issues that divide the circuit courts.87  
One circuit split involves whether consent judgments that 
expressly reserve a right to appeal are final judgments for 
purposes of appeal.  There are differing views concerning the 
appealability of a consent judgment that provides for litigation to 
continue at the trial level upon reversal and remand.  The view 
that appeal from such a consent judgment is proper is supported 
by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.88  The view that appeal 
from such a consent judgment is prohibited is supported by the 
Fifth Circuit and a broad reading of a recent Eighth Circuit 
holding.89 
The Eighth Circuit joined the discussion in a manner that 
added an additional wrinkle to the conflict.  A second split now 
involves how a conditional voluntary dismissal impacts finality.  
One view, that a judgment is final notwithstanding a conditional 
 
85 Id. § 4. Compare Clark v. Hous. Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 726 (11th Cir. 
1992) (holding that although consent judgments are ordinarily not appealable, 
appellate jurisdiction and review is appropriate where a party’s intent to appeal is 
expressly recognized in the stipulation of judgment), and Keefe v. Prudential Prop. 
and Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that a party does not 
waive the right to appeal upon entering a consent judgment when there is a clear 
understanding and agreement that one of the parties will appeal a contested issue 
decided at the district court level), with Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. 
& La., 607 F.2d 1100, 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (articulating that appeal 
from a judgment freely consented to by both parties—even if the consent judgment 
explicitly reserves one party’s right to appeal—is precluded). 
86 Schopler, supra note 11, § 3. 
87 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S. 
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *1. 
88 INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that a party to a consent judgment may appeal from that judgment if it 
explicitly reserves the right to do so); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 798 
F.2d 1372, 1376–77 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that there is no reason to frustrate the 
intent of parties who reserve the right to appeal a consent judgment). 
89 Amstar, 607 F.2d at 1100 (holding that appeal from a judgment freely 
consented to by both parties is precluded); see Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 
F.3d 839, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2013) (denying appeal from a consent judgment that 
explicitly reserved the plaintiff’s right to appeal). 
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voluntary dismissal, is supported by the Second Circuit.90  
Another view, that a conditional voluntary dismissal renders a 
judgment non-final, is supported by the Eighth Circuit’s recent 
holding.91 
The Eighth Circuit confronted these issues of appealability 
in Ruppert v. Principal Life Insurance Co.92  The consent 
judgment in Ruppert went further than just reserving a right to 
appeal an adverse summary judgment ruling, as it also provided 
for the plaintiff to reassert a voluntarily dismissed claim on 
condition that a prior ruling be reversed on appeal.93  The court 
recognized that its decision to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
finality created a split with the Second Circuit. 
There are compelling reasons for both strict as well as more 
flexible interpretations and applications of the finality 
requirement.  This section’s discussion of the circuit splits begins 
by providing factual background on Ruppert to illustrate the 
circumstances in which issues of finality are raised with respect 
to consent judgments.  The discussion proceeds to the split 
regarding finality following voluntary dismissals, and concludes 
by detailing the split as to the permissibility of appeals from 
conditional consent judgments that allow for litigation to 
continue upon reversal and remand. 
A. Split One: Effect of Conditional Voluntary Dismissal on 
Finality 
In Ruppert, the Eighth Circuit held that a consent judgment 
was not final, and thus not appealable, because it provided for a 
voluntarily dismissed claim to “spring back to life” upon reversal 
and remand.94  Joseph Ruppert, as trustee of the Fairmount Park 
Inc. Retirement Savings Plan (“Fairmount Park”), a 401(k) plan, 
brought suit against the plan’s service provider, Principal Life 
Insurance Co. (“Principal”).95  Ruppert alleged that Principal 
breached its fiduciary duty to the plan by receiving and failing to 
 
90 Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a decision is 
final for purposes of appeal notwithstanding a plaintiff’s potential to reassert a 
dismissed claim in the event of remand). 
91 See Ruppert, 705 F.3d at 842 (stating that because the consent agreement 
provided for the plaintiff’s claim to “spring back to life,” the judgment was non-final). 
92 705 F.3d 839. 
93 Id. at 841. 
94 Id. at 842. 
95 Id. at 840. 
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disclose the receipt of revenue-sharing funds and engaging in 
other transactions prohibited by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security (“ERISA”).96  After Ruppert moved to certify a 
class comprised of trustees of similarly situated 401(k) plans 
provided by Principal, the district court denied the motion.97 
Following the denial of class certification, Ruppert proceeded 
with the case on an individual basis.98  After determining the cost 
of trial would be too substantial for a single plan’s claims, 
Ruppert and Principal entered into a confidential settlement 
agreement upon which Ruppert agreed to voluntarily dismiss 
Fairmount Park’s individual claim in return for $80,000.99  The 
parties jointly, and successfully, petitioned the court to enter a 
consent judgment on those terms.100  The parties’ agreement and 
the consent judgment expressly reserved Ruppert’s right to 
appeal the denial of certification, providing that “the Trustee 
explicitly reserves, on behalf of the Plan, his right to appeal the 
Court’s denial of class certification.”101  The consent judgment 
provided further that upon reversal, and subsequent class 
certification on remand, Ruppert would be able to participate in 
any eventual recovery of the class in excess of the $80,000 
provided for by the parties’ agreement.102 
Ruppert appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the 
denial of class certification was an abuse of the district court’s 
discretion.103  The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding 
that Ruppert’s individual claims had not been fully resolved since 
he would be permitted to petition the district court for additional 
recovery if the denial of certification was reversed and the case 
 
96 Id. at 841. 
97 Id. at 840. The court found that two of the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(a) were not satisfied. First, “that there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class,” and second, “that the claims or defenses of the 
representative party are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Id. at 841. 
98 Id. at 840. 
99 Id. at 841. 
100 Id. at 840. 
101 Id. at 841. Principal agreed that it would not take any position on appellate 
jurisdiction, and thus, as the Eighth Circuit noted, on appeal “Principal [was] silent 
on the question of jurisdiction.” Id. at 842. 
102 Id. at 841. The consent judgment also provided the potential for Ruppert to 
shift a percentage of the litigation costs he incurred to future class members. Id. at 
841–42. 
103 Id. at 842. 
FINAL_ENGELHARDT 10/7/2015 7:14 PM 
308 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:293   
remanded to the district court.104  The court cited Eighth Circuit 
precedent that “rejected an attempt ‘to manufacture appellate 
jurisdiction by crafting a stipulation in which [the appellant] tied 
the fate of his remaining claim to the outcome of his appeal.’ ”105 
The Eighth Circuit recognized that its holding conflicted 
with a Second Circuit case, Purdy v. Zeldes,106 in which the 
Second Circuit permitted appellate review despite the potential 
for the plaintiff to reassert a claim upon reversal and remand.107  
In Purdy, the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against his 
former attorney regarding presentencing representation, alleging 
three claims.108  After receiving adverse summary judgment 
rulings on two of his claims and engaging in limited discovery, 
Purdy decided his remaining claim was not worth pursuing by 
itself.109  Purdy moved for, and was granted, dismissal of his 
claim without prejudice, allowing for refiling of the claim only 
upon reversal of the summary judgment on his other two 
claims.110 
On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that the final 
judgment rule was not violated and that the case was 
reviewable.111  In applying a relatively flexible interpretation of 
finality, the Second Circuit supported its holding by stating that 
 
104 Id. The class would, of course, have to be awarded damages for Ruppert to 
seek a share of the recovery. However, it is not clear that class certification would be 
required to shift some of the legal fees Ruppert incurred. 
105 Id. at 842–43 (alteration in original) (quoting Clos v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 597 
F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2010)). In case the court was “wrong about finality,” its 
additional holding was that the consent judgment resolved Ruppert’s claim, 
therefore leaving him with no personal stake in the case and rendering the case 
moot. Id. at 843. The court also acknowledged that this backup holding created a 
split with the D.C. Circuit. See Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding “no difference between those who voluntarily settle 
individual claims and those who have their individual claims involuntarily 
extinguished,” as long as the party maintained an interest in shifting expenses 
related to the class action litigation). Further discussion of the backup mootness 
holding and the circuit split it created is beyond the scope of this Note. 
106 337 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit held that a decision is final 
for purposes of appeal irrespective of a plaintiff’s potential to reassert a dismissed 
claim in the event of remand, so long as the “plaintiff’s ability to reassert a claim is 
made conditional on obtaining a reversal from [the court of appeals].” Id. at 258. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 257. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. One thing worth noting is that Purdy did not involve a consent judgment. 
Rather, the court dismissed the remaining claim “without prejudice to refiling it if, 
but only if, the dismissal of his first two claims was reversed on appeal.” Id. 
111 Id. at 258. 
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the final judgment rule was not implicated because the dismissed 
claim could only be reasserted following a reversal, rather than 
at the unfettered discretion of the plaintiff, and that upon 
affirmance the case would come to an end.112  The court reasoned 
that tying the reassertion of the claim to appellate reversal 
“furthers the goal of judicial economy by permitting a plaintiff to 
forgo litigation on the dismissed claim[] while accepting the risk 
that if the appeal is unsuccessful, the litigation will end.”113  
However, according to the court, when reassertion is not tied to a 
reversal, the cost-benefit analysis is not nearly the same since 
the court cannot determine what resources may be saved, even 
upon an affirmance.114 
Despite recognizing the Second Circuit’s holding, the Eighth 
Circuit declined to follow it.115  Instead, the Eighth Circuit 
applied a more strict view of finality.  Notwithstanding the fact 
that Ruppert’s dismissal of Fairmount Park’s individual claim 
left nothing more for the district court to decide, the court held 
that the potential for Ruppert’s claim to “spring back to life,”116 
even if conditioned on a reversal, left Ruppert’s claims 
unresolved and thus violated the final judgment rule.117 
B. Split Two: Effect of the Potential for Litigation To Continue 
upon Reversal and Remand on the Appealability of Consent 
Judgments 
Next, it is appropriate to consider how a broader reading of 
Ruppert’s holding—that a consent judgment that provides for 
continued litigation upon reversal and remand is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal—conforms with Fifth Circuit 
precedent and conflicts with precedent of the Seventh and 
Eleventh Circuits. 
The view that appeal from a conditional consent judgment is 
prohibited is supported by the Fifth Circuit.  In Amstar Corp. v. 
Southern Pacific Transport Co. of Texas & Louisiana,118 the 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 257–58.(quoting Chappelle v. Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652, 
654 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
114 See id. at 258. 
115 Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2013). 
116 Id. at 842. 
117 See id. 
118 607 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). For Amstar’s facts, see supra 
Introduction. 
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parties agreed to a stipulation of facts and submitted a request to 
the court to enter a consent judgment on the parties’ terms.119  
The parties stipulated that Southern Pacific was liable and that 
it would pay the damages determined by the court’s partial 
summary judgment ruling.120  Despite the clear reservation of 
Amstar’s right to appeal the determination of damages, the Fifth 
Circuit dismissed an appeal from the consent judgment.121  
Relying on its own precedent, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the 
fact that both parties freely consented to the entry of a final 
judgment precludes an appeal from it.”122  The Fifth Circuit 
recently affirmed that review is precluded from a judgment that 
both parties freely consent to.123 
Arguably, the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ruppert and Fifth 
Circuit precedent together stand for the proposition that appeal 
from a consent judgment is not warranted—despite the consent 
judgment’s reservation of the right to appeal—when the 
judgment is entered with the actual consent of both parties and 
would result in continued litigation at the trial level upon 
reversal and remand. 
While consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent, a broader 
reading of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ruppert—that appeal 
is prohibited from a conditional consent judgment in which 
litigation will continue upon reversal and remand—conflicts with 
established precedent in the Seventh and Eleventh circuits.124 
 
119 Amstar Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. of Tex. & La., 449 U.S. 924, 925 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 924–25. 
121 See Amstar, 607 F.2d at 1100. 
122 Id. 
123 Jones v. Merck & Co. (In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.), 422 F. App’x. 315, 316 
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming Amstar, 607 F.2d 1100). 
124 Arguably, this broader reading with respect to the appealability of 
conditional consent judgments also creates a split with the First and Third Circuits 
which have held similar to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. See Keefe v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] party to a 
consent decree or other judgment entered by consent may appeal from that decree or 
judgment if it explicitly reserves the right to do so.”); BIW Deceived v. Local S6, 
Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 
1997) (“[A] party to a consent judgment is thereby deemed to waive any objections it 
has to matters within the scope of the judgment . . . .” (quoting Coughlin v. Regan, 
768 F.2d 468, 469–70 (1st Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, 
the First and Third Circuits’ precedents are not discussed further in this section to 
avoid unnecessary repetition. 
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1. Seventh Circuit Precedent 
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit supports 
the view that appeals from conditional consent judgments are 
permissible.125  After recognizing “a split among the circuits with 
respect to whether a stipulated judgment may be appealed,”126 
the Seventh Circuit soon answered in the affirmative in INB 
Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc.127  INB Banking involved a 
conversion action in which INB Banking Company (“INB Bank”) 
sought to recover possession of two trucks that it had leased to a 
third party, B&P Excavating, Inc., which traded the trucks to 
Iron Peddlers.128  After the district court’s evidentiary ruling on a 
motion in limine, Iron Peddlers was effectively left without a 
defense.129  Iron Peddlers then consented to a judgment in favor 
of INB Bank but specifically sought to reserve a right to appeal 
the exclusion of evidence.130  Judgment was entered by the court 
“without waiving the right of the defendant to appeal the 
exclusion of the above evidence.”131  On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit decided to adopt Eleventh Circuit precedent and “follow 
the same rule”132 that “a party who consents to judgment while 
explicitly reserving the right to appeal preserves that right.”133  
The Seventh Circuit granted appeal despite the defendant’s 
consent to the district court’s judgment, as well as the potential 
for litigation to continue at the district court upon a reversal of 
the exclusion of evidence.134 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed INB Banking and “provid[ed] a 
more complete explanation of the existence of appellate 
jurisdiction over consent judgments that reserve a right of 
 
125 INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a party to a consent decree or other judgment entered by consent may 
appeal from that decree or judgment if that party explicitly reserves the right to do 
so). 
126 Hudson v. Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 922 F.2d 1306, 1312 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
127 993 F.2d 1291. 
128 Id. at 1291. 
129 Id. at 1292. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. (citing Shores v. Sklar, 885 F.2d 760, 764 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
134 See id. at 1292. 
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appeal”135 in Downey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.136  In 
Downey, the Seventh Circuit explained that a consent judgment 
that reserves a right to appeal does not constitute a waiver of, 
but rather ensures the right to, appeal.137  In holding a 
conditional consent judgment final, the court said that “for 
jurisdictional purposes there is no distinction between ‘consent’ 
and ‘adversarial’ judgments . . . and any party can appeal as of 
right from a final decision adverse to his interests.”138  The court 
believed that distinguishing between judgments entered with the 
consent of both parties and judgments entered against the wishes 
of one party “would create an extra-statutory condition on 
appeal.”139 
2. Eleventh Circuit Precedent 
As the Seventh Circuit made clear by adopting the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rule in INB Banking, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
are in agreement concerning the appealability of conditional 
consent judgments.  The Eleventh Circuit first confronted the 
issue in Dorse v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.140  Dorse 
involved a products liability claim.141  A partial summary 
judgment determined that the defendant was not privy to a 
government specification defense under applicable state law.142  
Following the summary judgment ruling, the parties stipulated 
to the entry of a consent judgment in favor of Dorse, but 
expressly reserved the defendant’s right to appeal the summary 
judgment ruling.143 
The Eleventh Circuit contemplated how the terms of the 
consent judgment impacted review of the case.  The court noted 
Fifth Circuit precedent from Amstar prohibiting appeals of this 
nature; however, the court determined that given the 
 
135 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S. 
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *17. 
136 266 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2001). 
137 Id. at 683 (“[A]n express reservation of the right to appeal avoids waiver of 
contested issues that had been resolved earlier in the litigation.”). 
138 Id. at 682. 
139 Id. 
140 798 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1986). 
141 Id. at 1373. 
142 Id. at 1374. 
143 Id. at 1374–75. The rationale was that the defendant was willing to pay the 
settled upon amount of damages, but only on condition that the partial summary 
judgment be affirmed on appeal. 
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stipulation’s clear recognition of the defendant’s right to appeal, 
there was “no reason why that intent should be frustrated in this 
case.”144  The Eleventh Circuit held this way despite the 
possibility of continued litigation upon a reversal.  In fact, a 
review on the merits led to a reversal and remand to the district 
court for further proceedings.145 
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the Dorse court 
granted appellate review because “the defendant expressly 
reserved the right to appeal,” but distinguished the facts of the 
case at hand in which the defendant did not reserve—and thus 
the defendant was not entitled to—a right to appeal.146 
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits are in agreement that 
appeal from a conditional consent judgment is permissible, as 
long as the judgment reserves a party’s right to appeal.147  This 
proposition stands in stark contrast to the Fifth Circuit which 
prohibits appeal from a judgment consented to by both parties.148  
It also appears to be a split from a broader reading of the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding in Ruppert, which prohibits appellate review 
from a consent judgment despite an explicit reservation of the 
right to appeal, because of the potential for litigation to continue 
at the trial level on remand.149 
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST STRICT REQUIREMENT OF 
FINALITY FOR CONSENT JUDGMENTS 
Hesitancy to grant appellate review—as displayed by the 
Fifth Circuit and recently the Eighth Circuit—is rooted in strict 
adherence to the requirement of finality.150  Yet, granting 
review—as displayed by the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits—is based on more flexible and likely practical 
application of the finality requirement.151 
 
144 Id. at 1376–77. 
145 Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 957, 958 (11th Cir. 1988). 
146 Yunker v. Allianceone Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 701 F.3d 369, 374 n.3 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
147 See supra Part II.B.1. 
148 See supra Part II.B. 
149 See supra Part II.B. 
150 See, e.g., Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 
685, 688 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice, coupled with the intent to 
refile the voluntarily dismissed claims after an appeal of the interlocutory order, is a 
clear evasion of the judicial and statutory limits on appellate jurisdiction.”); see also 
supra Part I.A.1. 
151 See supra Parts II.A, II.B.1–2. 
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A. Arguments for a Strict Requirement of Finality 
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ allegiance to the final 
judgment rule is motivated by the policy of avoiding “piecemeal 
litigation”152 and the rule that “[a] case is not to be sent up in 
fragments.”153  Strict adherence to finality arguably achieves 
three objectives: protecting the roles of trial and appellate courts, 
ensuring smoother trials, and preserving scarce appellate 
resources.154 
First, a strict requirement of finality preserves the 
traditional allocation of power between the district courts and the 
circuit courts.155  The trial process facilitates effective appellate 
review and thus helps ensure equitable results for the parties.156  
Delayed appellate review protects a trial judge’s authority by 
allowing efficient governance of trials as well as attaching 
greater significance to district court rulings due to the inability 
to review interlocutory orders.157  These benefits help a trial court 
satisfy its primary obligations of fact finding, applying legal 
standards, and ruling on procedural matters.158  Fulfillment of 
these responsibilities benefits appellate courts by allowing them 
to focus solely on important substantive issues and also receive a 
well-developed record that presents these issues in a fuller 
setting.159 
Second, in addition to the relatively abstract notion of 
preserving the functions of trial and appellate courts, a strict 
requirement of finality allows trial proceedings to progress more 
smoothly and efficiently.160  Courts often speak of “efficiency” 
with respect to avoiding interference with and deliberate delay of 
trial court proceedings by having unnecessary matters reviewed 
 
152 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945); see also Fairbrook 
Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 519 F.3d 421, 425 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(“Despite our frequent warnings, many lawyers use this dismissal-without-prejudice 
tactic to evade the statute limiting our appellate jurisdiction to the review of final 
orders.”). 
153 Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233–34 (quoting Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 147 U.S. 
337, 341 (1893)). 
154 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28. 
155 See id. § 3907. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. § 3905. 
158 Id. § 3907. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
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on appeal.161  First and foremost, more efficient proceedings save 
litigants time and money.  Next, a smoother trial process helps 
prevent the weakening of both testimonial and real evidence 
from the passing of time as well as time lapses in trial 
proceedings.162  Maintaining the strength and credibility of 
evidence is crucial to avoiding prejudice to the jury and ensuring 
the jury can perform its proper function.163  Finally, by delaying 
review, issues may be resolved that could have resulted in 
numerous interlocutory appeals.164  This delay in review allows 
cases to be decided more quickly and brings about closure for 
parties sooner.165  Avoiding these interlocutory appeals also 
serves the third objective of finality—conserving appellate 
resources. 
Third, a strict concept of finality is vital to ensuring the most 
efficient allocation of limited appellate resources.  As the circuit 
courts become more burdened—case filings rose four percent in 
the federal circuit courts from 2011 to 2012166—less and less time 
can be devoted to deciding more difficult cases correctly.167  With 
less time allocated to difficult issues, less clearly articulated 
rules presumably will follow.  Consequently, district courts may 
have trouble applying circuit court decisions correctly, which will 
lead to more appeals and further strain on appellate resources.  
This foreseeable problem supports relieving the burden on circuit 
courts.  In the context of consent judgments, this can be achieved 
by denying appeals, or at most, applying the traditional waiver of 
 
161 Id.; see also Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 
(1987) (“[T]he finality rule of § 1291 protects a variety of interests that contribute to 
the efficiency of the legal system. Pretrial appeals may cause disruption, delay, and 
expense for the litigants; they also burden appellate courts by requiring immediate 
consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by the end of trial. In 
addition, the finality doctrine protects the strong interest in allowing trial judges to 
supervise pretrial and trial procedures without undue interference.”) Unnecessary 
appellate lawmaking is also avoided. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907. 
162 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. 
166 U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2012, USCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2012 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2015). 
167 Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 
95 YALE L.J. 62, 86 (1985). 
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error standard of review.168  Doing so allows appellate courts to 
shift resources from judgments entered with the consent of both 
parties to nonconsensual judgments which intuitively involve 
more dispute.169 
B. Arguments for a More Flexible Interpretation of Finality 
On the other hand, two important considerations arguably 
support a more flexible approach to the finality requirement in 
regards to consent judgments: facilitating settlements and 
conserving judicial resources. 
Settlement remains a high priority in the federal court 
system.170  In fact, district courts are granted a great deal of 
flexibility to encourage settlements which are “viewed as an 
efficient cure for the current backlog of cases and high costs of 
litigation.”171  Traditionally, the settlement rate has been 
recognized at about ninety-five percent of cases.172  Since a 
substantial majority of cases are settled, settlement is the model 
of civil litigation and provides a way to avoid the time and 
expense involved in a court’s application of strict legal rules and 
determinations of right and wrong.173  Further, settlement 
generally provides the best outcome for plaintiffs, far exceeding 
success at trial in which plaintiffs are successful in “less than 5 
percent of filed cases.”174  Defendants also benefit by saving time 
and money by settling the case and may also protect their 
reputation and image, something important to companies and 
individuals alike.  In addition to benefitting parties, settlement 
ultimately benefits the federal judicial system which would 
collapse without settlements serving to contain the district 
courts’ workload. 
 
168 Zitko, supra note 55, at 247–48. This standard subjects conditional consent 
judgments to a de facto rule of non-appealability. See supra Part I.B. 
169 See Zitko, supra note 55, at 247–48. 
170 Id. at 261; see U.S. District Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.us 
courts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-district-courts.aspx (last visited Feb. 
24, 2014). 
171 Zitko, supra note 55, at 261 (footnote omitted). 
172 Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and 
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009). 
 
173 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907. Time is also saved on other aspects of 
a trial including jury selection. 
174 Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 172, at 112–13. 
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Granting appeals on the merits from conditional consent 
judgments facilitates settlement by providing leverage in 
negotiations.  When one party seeks to reserve a right to appeal, 
the other party essentially allows “a speedier and less costly road 
to appellate review” by consenting to an express reservation in 
the consent judgment.175  As a result, the consenting party has 
“greater bargaining power in fashioning the terms of 
settlement.”176  Similarly, a willingness to dispense with the right 
to appeal also provides a party with bargaining power in 
settlement discussions. 
First, a party set on reserving a right to appeal will likely be 
willing to agree to a lower settlement amount.  This scenario 
benefits both parties.  One party is able to secure review of a 
ruling that is generally detrimental to the case and that one feels 
was decided incorrectly, while the other party receives the 
benefit of paying relatively less with the reasonable assurance 
that district court rulings are affirmed on appeal in the vast 
majority of cases.177  A party wishing to secure appellate review 
would be motivated to agree to a relatively low settlement 
because the alternative means of securing a right to  
appeal—litigating to final judgment—would involve great time 
and expense. 
On the other hand, a party may be able to secure more 
favorable settlement terms by offering to forgo, rather than 
reserve, the right of appeal.  The ability to secure appellate 
review in a consent judgment may benefit settlement 
negotiations, even if the right is not reserved.  For example, had 
settlement talks in Ruppert reached a stalemate, the plaintiff 
could have offered to dispense with his right to review of the 
denial of class certification, and thus his right to seek further 
relief from the defendant.  Dispensing with this right, and thus 
not reserving a right to appeal, would have provided the 
defendant with certainty regarding its liability to the Fairmount 
Park fund—allowing more certainty in its financial planning 
going forward—and would also have saved the time, expense, 
and loss of reputation associated with fighting the claim on 
 
175 Zitko, supra note 55, at 262. 
176 Id. 
177 See Table B-1—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 
(March 31, 2012), USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/ 
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B01Mar12.pdf. 
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appeal.  Consequently, a defendant may be willing to agree to a 
higher payout, thus helping the parties overcome an impasse in 
negotiations.  Just how much leverage the plaintiff in Ruppert, or 
similarly situated parties, would have by offering to exclude a 
right to appeal from a consent judgment would likely depend on 
factors such as the party’s confidence in obtaining a reversal as 
well as its willingness to incur the opportunity costs associated 
with bringing an appeal.178 
Next, facilitating appeal through a more flexible 
interpretation of finality promotes judicial economy.  Judicial 
economy is a broad principle that the limited resources of the 
judicial system or a specific court should be efficiently managed 
and conserved.179  The truth is that a very large majority of 
district court decisions are affirmed on appeal.180  In 2012, for 
example, only 6.7% of district court decisions were reversed on 
appeal.181  Although conditional consent judgments may lead to 
continued litigation at the district court level, the rate of reversal 
ensures that this scenario will be quite limited.  Further, it is 
likely that the resources expended on continued litigation on 
remand would be heavily outweighed by the resources saved by 
avoiding the motion practice and litigation that would otherwise 
be required to reach final judgment.  Therefore, it is likely that in 
the aggregate, “whenever a party is willing to forego fully 
litigating its case at the district court level . . . to have a chance 
at getting certain findings reversed on appeal,” judicial resources 
will be conserved.182 
To understand how judicial resources are conserved, consider 
a claim that a plaintiff prefers not to litigate as an individual 
claim after receiving adverse rulings on her two other claims.183  
This plaintiff may be willing to voluntarily dismiss the claim 
through a consent judgment and risk abdication of the claim 
upon affirmance, in exchange for a speedier road to appeal.  If 
 
178 These opportunity costs include the time, money, and other resources that 
could be devoted elsewhere—something especially important when a plaintiff is 
suing multiple parties. 
179 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 975 (10th ed. 2014). 
180 See Table B-1—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 
(March 31, 2012), USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/ 
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B01Mar12.pdf. 
181 Id. 
182 Zitko, supra note 55, at 262. 
183 See Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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this cost-benefit analysis with respect to securing appeal is not 
available, it may not be worth it for the plaintiff to dismiss the 
claim.  Consequently, the plaintiff may litigate the individual 
claim by itself and then seek appellate review regarding her two 
other claims.  That scenario seems to involve unnecessary time 
and costs, which is especially troubling when considered on a 
larger scale involving many similarly situated plaintiffs. 
IV. SOLUTION 
A clear split in authority exists with respect to finality 
regarding conditional voluntary dismissals as well as the 
appealability of consent judgments that reserve a right to appeal.  
Despite noting the conflicting views of other circuits, the Eighth 
Circuit appeared to have no intention of revisiting its position on 
these issues in Ruppert, and it is likely that other circuits will do 
the same when confronting similar finality issues.184  Further, it 
remains unclear how circuits with limited or no exposure to these 
issues may decide.185 
A uniform approach will help resolve these discrepancies.  
The result should be a rule requiring appellate courts to 
recognize an express reservation of a right to appeal in a consent 
judgment, including in consent judgments in which reasserting a 
claim is conditioned on a reversal.  This approach would combine 
Second Circuit precedent regarding appealability following 
conditional voluntary dismissals and precedent from both the 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits regarding the appealability of 
consent judgments which reserve a right to appeal. 
Four primary arguments support a solution to this effect.  
First, a uniform standard recognizing the right to appeal would 
provide transparency for courts and parties to settlement 
negotiations and thus further a consent judgment’s facilitation of 
settlements.  Second, it would promote judicial economy.  Third, 
the solution would not violate the final judgment rule.  Fourth, 
and finally, past flexibility in interpreting the limits of statutory 
appellate jurisdiction support adopting the solution. 
 
184 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S. 
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *25. 
185 For instance, will other circuits decide similarly to the Seventh Circuit and 
adopt another circuit’s more flexible rule, or will they decide similarly to the Eighth 
Circuit and adhere to longstanding precedent within their respective circuit 
supporting a strict adherence to finality? 
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A. Providing Certainty and Facilitating Settlement 
First, a uniform rule would provide courts and parties with 
more certainty and thus promote settlements.  A current issue is 
that parties cannot be certain whether a reservation of a right to 
appeal in a consent judgment will be recognized.  For example, 
Third Circuit precedent on the appealability of consent 
judgments has been very inconsistent.  The Third Circuit has at 
times applied an even more liberal approach than the Seventh 
and Eleventh Circuits by considering the intent of the parties 
rather than requiring a right to appeal to be explicitly reserved 
in the consent judgment; yet, at other times the Third Circuit has 
applied a strict requirement of finality by denying appeal despite 
express reservation of a right to appeal in the consent 
judgment.186 
Assurance that a right to appeal will be recognized “will 
make all parties clearly aware of their respective rights under a 
consent judgment,” and will help avoid the type of inconsistency 
in the Third Circuit that limits the effectiveness of conditional 
consent judgments.187  While negotiating, parties will be certain 
how the appellate court will interpret the right to appeal and 
what precedent it will apply.  A consistent, predictable standard 
will allow parties to negotiate at arm’s length without 
speculation or uncertainty and to focus their concerns on arriving 
at speedy and equitable outcomes. 
While assurance of how conditional consent judgments will 
be treated on appeal will likely be beneficial, it may be argued 
that the assurance should be that a right to appeal will be 
forfeited, rather than reserved.  First, it may be in a party’s best 
interest to settle an issue once and for all rather than taking a 
risk by accepting a lesser payout in return for expediting appeal.  
Not having the ability to appeal as an option will force parties to 
act rationally and make sure to secure agreements that are in 
their best interest.  Second, negotiating over the reservation or 
 
186 Compare Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (granting review because it was the parties’ intent to reserve a right of 
appeal, despite not explicitly doing so), and Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., 
Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 176–77, 182 (3d Cir. 2004) (permitting review even when “[t]he 
intention to appeal was not included in the stipulation” and litigation would 
continue at the district level upon remand), with Verzilli v. Flexon, Inc., 295 F.3d 
421, 424–25 (3d Cir. 2002) (denying review despite an explicit reservation of the 
right to appeal because litigation would continue in the district court upon reversal). 
187 Zitko, supra note 55, at 263. 
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abdication of the right to appeal may actually derail negotiations.  
With all of the considerations that go into the determination of 
whether to pursue or forgo an appeal—such as the chances of 
success on appeal and the willingness to expend the resources to 
bring the appeal—negotiations may become more complicated.  
Therefore, negotiating over the reservation or forfeit of a right to 
appeal may actually prolong discussions as well as lead to an 
impasse, rather than help overcome one. 
Notwithstanding these contentions, it is clear that direction 
is needed and it seems that a standard of recognizing appeals 
would be most beneficial.  Despite the potential to prolong the 
final resolution of a case and to derail settlement talks, 
settlements would be encouraged by allowing appeal for two 
reasons.  First, many consent judgments are entered because of 
the potential to reserve a right to appeal.  Without being able to 
reserve such a right, parties may forgo entering a stipulation.  
Second, as discussed earlier, reserving a right to appeal presents 
important leverage in settlement negotiations.188  A party 
persistent on reserving a right to appeal is more likely to agree to 
a relatively low settlement amount, while a party wishing for the 
other party to forgo appeal is more likely to agree to a relatively 
high settlement amount. 
B. Promoting Judicial Economy 
Second, a uniform rule recognizing the reservation of a right 
to appeal and to also reassert claims upon reversal would 
promote judicial economy.  It is true that, in an initial sense, 
denying appeals from consent judgments would save appellate 
judicial resources.189  However, the inability to bring an appeal 
may lead to a decrease in consent judgments and thus increased 
time spent adjudicating cases at the district court level.190  
Further, an increase in the number of cases litigated to final 
judgment may lead to an increase in requests for appellate 
review.191 
It may be argued that judicial resources will not be 
conserved in the aggregate, because upon reversal, remand, and 
further litigation at the trial level, more resources will have been 
 
188 See supra Part III.B. 
189 Zitko, supra note 55, at 261. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
FINAL_ENGELHARDT 10/7/2015 7:14 PM 
322 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:293   
expended, which is a major issue raised in opposition to 
interlocutory appeals.  Appellants face little downside to a purely 
interlocutory appeal because even if the appeal is unsuccessful, 
they remain in the same position that they would have been in 
had the appeal been prohibited.192  However, there is an 
important distinction with respect to purely interlocutory appeals 
and conditional consent judgments.  In the case of conditional 
consent judgments, because a judgment has been entered, the 
case ends upon affirmance of the judgment.193  The fact that the 
case ends upon affirmance protects against “an abusive appellant 
attempting to appeal each minor issue in a case.”194  This is 
something that generally cannot be avoided with purely 
interlocutory appeals in which the case continues at the trial 
level following affirmance or denial. 
Further, a clear requirement that a right to appeal must be 
reserved to secure appeal will benefit both trial and appellate 
judges.  Trial judges will know what language a consent 
judgment must contain and will not waste time determining first, 
whether appeal will be granted, and second, what procedures are 
required to secure review.  Appellate courts will also save time by 
not looking beyond the terms of the judgment and to the intent of 
the parties.195  Further, a consistent standard will avoid the need 
for appellate courts to determine where they stand on the  
issue—including reviewing their respective precedent as well as 
other courts’ precedent and determining which to follow. 
Although there may be instances when an appellate court 
has to hear an appeal it may not otherwise have to allocate 
resources to, or a district court has to continue proceedings upon 
remand, a rule allowing for appeal from consent judgments 
expressly reserving the right to appeal will likely promote 
judicial economy.  Judicial economy would be promoted because 
the rule would encourage parties to forego needless trial court 
litigation, there is a high likelihood of affirmance and thus an 
ending of the case, it would safeguard against abusive appeals of 
insignificant issues, and benefit trial and appellate judges. 
 
192 Id. at 262. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See, e.g., Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (granting review because it was the parties’ intent to reserve a right of 
appeal, despite not explicitly doing so). 
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C. Remaining Faithful to the Final Judgment Rule 
Third, the proposed solution would not weaken the final 
judgment rule.  The only way a dismissed claim could be 
reasserted is if the parties return to the trial court on remand 
following a reversal by the appellate court.  In that case, because 
of the remand, the case would not have been fully resolved 
anyway.196  The argument can be made, as discussed above, that 
Congress has made its intent concerning appellate jurisdiction 
clear and consequently, expediting appeal in a way not explicitly 
provided by statue is a run around of Congress’s intent.197  
However, it is important to consider that finality jurisprudence 
has involved statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court.  The 
collateral order doctrine, for instance, is a product of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the interlocutory appeals 
provision of § 1292 and finality requirement of § 1291.198  
Similarly, the Supreme Court can provide clarity on conditional 
consent judgments, not by rewriting the final judgment rule, but 
by articulating that conditional consent judgments fit within 
§ 1291’s requirement of a final judgment because these 
judgments resolve all outstanding issues and leave nothing for 
the trial court to decide.199  In fact, these judgments fit squarely 
into the traditional definition of a final judgment—one that “ends 
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment.”200 
D. Past Flexibility 
Finally, we have seen flexibility in applying the finality 
requirement.  For example, the Second Circuit permits appeal 
following a voluntarily dismissal of a claim despite the ability to 
reassert the claim upon reversal.201  Along the same lines, there 
have been numerous rule changes with respect to appellate 
jurisdiction including the adoption and eventual abandonment of 
 
196 Brief for Appellant at 17–18, Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(No. 02-7468), 2002 WL 32487715, at *17–18. 
197 See supra Part I.A.1. 
198 See id. 
199 See supra Part I.B. 
200 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
201 Purdy, 337 F.3d at 258. The Second Circuit held that a decision is final for 
purposes of appeal irrespective of a plaintiff’s potential to reassert a dismissed claim 
in the event of remand, so long as the “plaintiff’s ability to reassert a claim is made 
conditional on obtaining a reversal from [the court of appeals].” Id. 
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the “death knell” doctrine which permitted interlocutory appeals 
following the denial of class certification.202  Thus, further 
flexibility should be permitted to help promote the “efficient 
administration of justice in the federal courts.”203 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that a uniform approach is needed in the context of 
conditional consent judgments because “[t]here is, still, too little 
finality about ‘finality.’ ”204  As established above, the right to 
appeal from a consent judgment is not only a central issue in 
cases involving denials of class certification, such as Ruppert, but 
also in a wide range of cases concerning a variety of issues.205  A 
rule that combines Second Circuit precedent with that of the 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits,206 allowing appellate review from 
consent judgments that expressly reserve a right to appeal as 
well as the reassertion of claims upon a reversal, would provide 
stability in a very practical area of the law while serving the 
interests of the federal judiciary and litigants alike. 
 
202 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3907. 
203 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 134 S. 
Ct. 152 (2013) (No. 12-1425), 2013 WL 2470139, at *1. 
204 Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 556 F.3d 164, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
205 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–29, Ruppert, 134 S. Ct. 152 (No. 12-1425) 
at *28–29; see also supra Part II. 
206 Precedent concerning appellate jurisdiction with respect to conditional 
voluntary dismissals and precedent regarding conditional consent judgments, 
respectively. 
